kami_apple_exchage/DRAFT_SECURITY_REPORT.md

Vulnerability Report

1. Container Runs as Root

• Vulnerability: The Docker container runs as the root user.
• Severity: High
• Location: backend/Dockerfile
• Line Content: Not applicable (absence of USER instruction).
• Description: Running a container as root is a security risk. If an attacker gains control of the application, they will have root privileges inside the container, which can be used to escalate privileges further.
• Recommendation: Create a non-root user and switch to it using the USER instruction in the Dockerfile.

2. Hardcoded Database Credentials

• Vulnerability: The DATABASE_URL in the .env.production file contains a hardcoded password.
• Severity: Critical
• Location: backend/.env.production
• Line Content: DATABASE_URL="postgresql+asyncpg://postgres:password@db:5432/apple_exchange"
• Description: The production database credentials are hardcoded in the .env.production file, which is then copied into the Docker image. This makes it easy for an attacker to gain access to the database if they can read the contents of the image.
• Recommendation: Use a secrets management solution to inject the database password into the container at runtime. The DATABASE_URL should be constructed using an environment variable for the password, similar to how JWT_SECRET_KEY and ENCRYPTION_KEY are handled.

3. Test Container Runs as Root

• Vulnerability: The test Docker container runs as the root user.
• Severity: High
• Location: backend/Dockerfile.test
• Line Content: Not applicable (absence of USER instruction).
• Description: Running a container as root is a security risk, even in a test environment. If an attacker gains control of the application, they will have root privileges inside the container, which can be used to escalate privileges further.
• Recommendation: Create a non-root user and switch to it using the USER instruction in the Dockerfile.

4. Worker Container Runs as Root

• Vulnerability: The worker Docker container runs as the root user.
• Severity: High
• Location: backend/Dockerfile.worker
• Line Content: Not applicable (absence of USER instruction).
• Description: Running a container as root is a security risk. If an attacker gains control of the application, they will have root privileges inside the container, which can be used to escalate privileges further.
• Recommendation: Create a non-root user and switch to it using the USER instruction in the Dockerfile.

5. Potential IDOR in get_order endpoint

• Vulnerability: Potential Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) in the get_order endpoint.
• Severity: High
• Location: backend/app/api/v1/orders.py
• Line Content: async def get_order(order_id: str, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_async_db)) -> OrderDetailResponse:
• Description: The get_order endpoint takes an order_id from the URL and retrieves the order details. There are no checks to verify that the authenticated user has permission to access the requested order. An attacker could potentially enumerate order IDs to view orders belonging to other users.
• Recommendation: Implement an access control check to ensure that the current user is authorized to view the requested order. This typically involves checking if the order.user_id matches the current_user.id.

6. Missing Access Control on Task Management Endpoints

• Vulnerability: Missing access control on task management endpoints.
• Severity: High
• Location: backend/app/api/v1/tasks.py
• Line Content: async def toggle_task_state(request: TaskControlRequest) -> TaskControlResponse:
• Description: The endpoints in tasks.py for controlling the task queue (/toggle, /status, etc.) do not have any authorization checks. This means that any user, including unauthenticated users, could potentially pause, resume, or otherwise interfere with the task queue, leading to a denial of service.
• Recommendation: Implement a robust access control mechanism for all task management endpoints. Only authorized users (e.g., administrators) should be able to perform these actions. This can be achieved using FastAPI's dependency injection system to require an authenticated user with the necessary permissions.

7. Potential IDOR in user_data endpoints

• Vulnerability: Potential Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) in the user_data endpoints.
• Severity: High
• Location: backend/app/api/v1/user_data.py
• Line Content: async def get_user_data(user_id: str, service: UserDataService = Depends(get_user_data_service)): and async def delete_user_data(user_id: str, service: UserDataService = Depends(get_user_data_service)):
• Description: The get_user_data and delete_user_data endpoints take a user_id from the URL and retrieve or delete the user's data. There are no checks to verify that the authenticated user has permission to access or delete the requested user's data. An attacker could potentially enumerate user IDs to view or delete user data belonging to other users.
• Recommendation: Implement an access control check to ensure that the current user is authorized to view or delete the requested user data. This typically involves checking if the user_id matches the current_user.id or if the current user has administrative privileges.

8. Potential IDOR in get_task_status endpoint

• Vulnerability: Potential Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) in the get_task_status endpoint.
• Severity: Medium
• Location: backend/app/api/v1/user_data.py
• Line Content: async def get_task_status(task_id: str, service: UserDataService = Depends(get_user_data_service)):
• Description: The get_task_status endpoint takes a task_id from the URL and retrieves the task status. There are no checks to verify that the authenticated user has permission to access the requested task status. An attacker could potentially enumerate task IDs to view the status of tasks belonging to other users.
• Recommendation: Implement an access control check to ensure that the current user is authorized to view the requested task status. This could involve associating tasks with users and checking for ownership.

9. Permissive CORS and ALLOWED_HOSTS Configuration

• Vulnerability: The ALLOWED_HOSTS and CORS_ORIGINS are set to ["*"] by default.
• Severity: Medium
• Location: backend/app/core/config.py
• Line Content: ALLOWED_HOSTS: list[str] = Field(default=["*"], description="允许的主机列表") and CORS_ORIGINS: list[str] = Field(default=["*"], description="CORS允许的源列表")
• Description: The ALLOWED_HOSTS and CORS_ORIGINS settings are configured to allow any host. This is a permissive setting that could be a security risk in a production environment. A permissive CORS policy can make the application vulnerable to cross-site request forgery (CSRF) attacks, and a permissive ALLOWED_HOSTS setting can make the application vulnerable to host header attacks.
• Recommendation: In a production environment, ALLOWED_HOSTS and CORS_ORIGINS should be set to a specific list of trusted domains.

10. Use of KEYS command in Redis

• Vulnerability: The list_states method uses the KEYS command to get all keys matching a pattern.
• Severity: Low
• Location: backend/app/core/state_manager.py
• Line Content: keys = await redis_client.keys(search_pattern)
• Description: The KEYS command can block the Redis server while it is executing, and can cause performance issues on a Redis instance with a large number of keys. This could be a potential denial of service vector.
• Recommendation: Use the SCAN command instead of KEYS to iterate over the keys in a non-blocking way.

11. Storage of PII in Plain Text

• Vulnerability: Personally Identifiable Information (PII) is stored in plain text in the database.
• Severity: Medium
• Location: backend/app/models/user_data.py
• Line Content: Not applicable (model definition).
• Description: The UserData model contains sensitive user information such as name, address, email, and phone number. This data is stored in the database without any encryption at the application level. If the database is compromised, all of this sensitive user data will be exposed in plain text.
• Recommendation: Encrypt sensitive PII in the database. This can be done at the application level using a library like sqlalchemy-utils with the EncryptedType or by using database-level encryption features.